Ayelet Harpaz - alto
Anne Faulborn - harpsichord
Tatiana Koleva - percussion
Carola Arons - voice
Bert Luppes - voice
Yannis Kyriakides - live electronics
Definitions of the Emotions
from the Ethics of Spinoza, Part III
numbers also correspond to tracks on CD
01 Desire (Cupiditas) is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived, as determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself.
02 Pleasure (Laetitia) is the transition of a man from a less to a greater perfection.
03 Pain (Tristitia) is the transition of a man from a greater to a less perfection.
04 Wonder (Admiratio) is the conception of anything, wherein the mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept in question has no connection with other concepts
05 Contempt (Contempus) is the conception of anything which touches the mind so little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine those qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it.
06 Love (Amor) is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.
07 Hatred (Odium) is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.
08 Inclination (Propensio) is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure.
09 Aversion (Aversio) is pain, accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally the cause of pain.
10 Devotion (Devotio) is love towards one whom we admire.
11 Derision (Irisio ) is pleasure arising from our conceiving the presence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which we hate.
12 Hope (Spes) is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea of something past or
future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue.
13 Fear (Metus) is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue.
14 Confidence (Secutitas) is pleasure arising from the idea of something past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.
15 Despair (Desperatio) is pain arising from the idea of something past or future,
wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.
16 Joy (Gaudium) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past, which has had an issue beyond our hope.
17 Disappointment (Conscientiae) is pain accompanied by the idea of something past, which has had an issue contrary to our hope.
18 Pity (Commiseratio) is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which has befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves.
19 Approval (Favor) is love towards one who has done good to another.
20 Indignation (Indignatio) is hatred towards one who has done evil to another.
21 Partiality (Existimatio) is thinking too highly of anyone because of the love we bear him.
22 Disparagement (Despectus) is thinking too meanly of anyone, because we hate him.
23 Envy (Invidia) is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be pained by another's good fortune, and to rejoice in another's evil fortune.
24 Sympathy (Misericordia) is love, in so far as it induces a man to feel pleasure at
another's good fortune, and pain at another's evil fortune.
25 Self-approval (Aquiesentia) is pleasure arising from a man's contemplation of himself and his own power of action.
26 Humility (Humilitas) is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his own weakness of body or mind.
27 Repentance (Poenitentia) is pain accompanied by the idea of some action, which we believe we have performed by the free decision of our mind.
28 Pride (Superbia) is thinking too highly of one's self from self-love.
29 Self-abasement (Abjectio) is thinking too meanly of one's self by reason of pain.
30 Honour (Gloria) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action of our own, which we believe to be praised by others.
31 Shame (Pudor) is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of our own, which we believe to be blamed by others.
32 Regret (Desiderium ) is the desire or appetite to possess something, kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing, and at the same time constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude the existence of it.
33 Emulation (Aemulatio) is the desire of something, engendered in us by our conception that others have the same desire.
34 Gratitude (Gratia) is the desire or zeal springing from love, whereby we endeavour to benefit him, who with similar feelings of love has conferred a benefit on us.
35 Benevolence (Benevolentia) is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity.
36 Anger (Ira) is the desire, whereby through hatred we are induced to injure one whom we hate.
37 Revenge (Vindicta) is the desire whereby we are induced, through mutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar feelings, has injured us.
38 Cruelty or savageness (Crudelitas) is the desire, whereby a man is impelled to injure one whom we love or pity.
39 Timidity (Timor) is the desire to avoid a greater evil, which we dread, by undergoing a lesser evil.
40 Daring (Audacia) is the desire, whereby a man is set on to do something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt.
41 Cowardice (Pulcila) is attributed to one, whose desire is checked by the fear of some danger which his equals dare to encounter.
42 Consternation (Consternatio) is attributed to one, whose desire of avoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he fears.
43 Courtesy or deference (Humanitas) is the desire of acting in a way that should please men, and refraining from that which should displease them.
44 Ambition (Ambitio) is the immoderate desire of power.
45 Luxury (Luxuria) is excessive desire, or even love of living sumptuously.
46 Intemperance (Ebrietas) is the excessive desire and love of drinking.
47 Avarice (Avaritia) is the excessive desire and love of riches.
48 Lust (Libido) is desire and love in the matter of sexual intercourse.
Tracks 49 and 50 are silent tracks, placed there in order to create some space between the two parts. They are each one minute in duration.
Correspondence from Spinoza to Schüller
51 Though I am, at present, much occupied with other matters, not to mention my delicate health, your singular courtesy, or, to name the chief motive, your love of truth, impels me to satisfy your inquiries, as far as my poor abilities will permit.
52 I say that a thing is free, which exists and acts solely by the necessity of its own nature.
54 Thus also God understands Himself and all things freely, because it follows solely from the necessity of His nature, that He should understand all things.
58 You see I do not place freedom in free decision, but in free necessity.
59 However, let us descend to created things, which are all determined by external causes to exist and operate in a given determinate manner.
60 In order that this may be clearly understood, let us conceive a very simple thing.
61 For instance, a stone receives from the impulsion of an external cause, a certain quantity of motion,
62 by virtue of which it continues to move after the impulsion given by the external cause has ceased.
64 The permanence of the stone's motion is constrained, not necessary, because it must be defined by the impulsion of an external cause.
66 What is true of the stone is true of any individual, however complicated its nature, or varied its functions,
68 inasmuch as every individual thing is necessarily determined by some external cause to exist and operate in a fixed and determinate manner.
69 Further conceive, I beg, that a stone, while continuing in motion, should be capable of thinking and knowing, that it is endeavouring, as far as it can, to continue to move.
70 Such a stone, being conscious merely of its own endeavour and not at all indifferent, would believe itself to be completely free,
71 and would think that it continued in motion solely because of its own wish.
This is that human freedom, which all boast that they possess,
72 and which consists solely in the fact, that men are conscious of their own desire, but are ignorant of the causes whereby that desire has been determined.
74 Thus an infant believes that it desires milk freely;
77 an angry child thinks he wishes freely for vengeance,
79 a timid child thinks he wishes freely to run away.
Again, a drunken man thinks, that from the free decision of his mind he speaks words,
80 which afterwards, when sober, he would like to have left unsaid.
83 So the delirious, the garrulous, and others of the same sort think that they act from the free decision of their mind,
84 not that they are carried away by impulse.
85 As this misconception is innate in all men, it is not easily conquered.
90 For, although experience abundantly shows, that men can do anything rather than check their desires,
92 and that very often, when a prey to conflicting emotions, they see the better course and follow the worse,
94 they yet believe themselves to be free;
because in some cases their desire for a thing is slight,
96 and can easily be overruled by the recollection of something else, which is frequently present in the mind.
97 I have thus, if I mistake not, sufficiently explained my opinion regarding free and constrained necessity, and also regarding so- called human freedom:
98 from what I have said you will easily be able to reply to your friend's objections.